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Abstract
Many researchers have used federal funds futures rates as measures of ﬁnancial
markets’ expectations of future monetary policy. However, to the extent that fed-
eral funds futures reﬂect risk premia, these measures require some adjustment for
risk premia. In this paper, we document that excess returns on federal funds futures
have been positive on average. We also document that expected excess returns are
strongly countercyclical. In particular, excess returns are surprisingly predictable
by employment growth and other business-cycle indicators such as Treasury yields
and corporate bond spreads. Excess returns on eurodollar futures display simi-
lar patterns. We document that simply ignoring these risk premia has important
consequences for the future expected path of monetary policy. We also investigate
whether risk premia matter for conventional measures of monetary policy surprises.
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11 Introduction
There is by now a very large and well accepted body of evidence against the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates for Treasury yields (Fama and Bliss
1987, Campbell and Shiller 1991, and Cochrane and Piazzesi 2003 provide evidence and
references). Excess returns on long Treasury securities over a very wide range of sample
periods have been positive on average and predictable over time. This paper documents
similar patterns for fed funds and eurodollar futures. We show that excess returns on
federal funds futures contracts at even the shortest horizons have been positive on av-
erage and predictable. The R2s depend on the holding period and range from 8% for
the 1-month horizon to 43% for the 6-month horizon. We document that expected ex-
cess returns are clearly countercyclical. We ﬁnd that employment numbers capture this
predictability well. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that nonfarm payroll numbers do better than
ﬁnancial business-cycle indicators, such as Treasury yield spreads and corporate bond
spreads. We ﬁnd that this behavior is robust both pre- and post-1994, is evident in
rolling regressions, and is also displayed by eurodollar futures.
Having documented signiﬁcant predictability of excess returns in the federal funds
futures market, we investigate to what extent accounting for risk premia would aﬀect
forecasts of the future course of monetary policy. Here, we ﬁnd that simply ignoring
risk premia can produce very misleading results. Speciﬁcally, forecasts based on the
expectations hypothesis tend to adapt too slowly to changes in the direction of monetary
policy. For example, right before recessions, when the Fed has already started easing, fed
funds futures keep forecasting high funds rates. Moreover, these forecast errors are highly
autocorrelated. As a consequence, we ﬁnd that deﬁning policy shocks as the diﬀerence
between actual target and lagged fed funds futures is not accurate. If risk premia only
change at business-cycle frequencies, it may be preferable to measure monetary policy
shocks as changes in near-dated federal funds futures.
Our ﬁndings on fed funds futures diﬀer from those for Treasuries in several dimensions.
First, we ﬁnd that the most important predictive variable is a macroeconomic variable:
nonfarm payroll employment. Previous studies found signiﬁcant results only for ﬁnancial
variables (such as term spreads). Second, fed funds future returns are actually traded
securities, while the zero-coupon yield data used in the paper cited above is constructed
by interpolation schemes. Thus, our results shed light on whether these predictability
patterns truly exist in ﬁxed income and futures markets. Third, ﬁxed income and federal
funds futures markets are potentially very diﬀerent markets,1 and the fact that we ﬁnd
similar patterns of predictable excess returns across the two markets is interesting in
itself. For example, federal funds futures contracts have maturities of just a few months
and may therefore be much less risky than long Treasuries, which have maturities of
1For example, the largest participants in the federal funds futures market (and eurodollar futures
and swaps markets) are typically ﬁnancial institutions looking to “lock in” funding at prespeciﬁed rates
(to hedge their own commercial and industrial loan portfolio, for example). The portfolios and hedging
demands of these institutions are potentially very diﬀerent from the largest participants in the Treasury
bond markets–foreign governments, state and local governments, insurance companies, and the like.
See Stigum (1990) for additional technical details on the Treasury and money markets.
2several years; also, the holding periods relevant for measuring excess returns on fed funds
futures contracts are much less than one year–contracts with more than six months to
maturity are rarely traded, and the vast majority of open interest is in contracts with
just one or two months to settlement–while the results for Treasuries typically assume
that the investor holds the securities for an entire year. Given the short maturities and
required holding periods to realize excess returns in the fed funds futures market, one
might think that risk premia in this market would be very small or nonexistent. We ﬁnd
that this is not the case.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 measures excess returns in
federal funds futures, and shows that these excess returns have varied over time and can
be predicted using a simple function of Treasury yields or other leading indicators of the
business cycle, such as corporate bond spreads. Section 3 shows that these excess returns
were predictable in real time as well as ex post. Section 4 shows that failing to adjust
for risk can lead to substantial errors in measuring monetary policy expectations, so that
the predictability of excess returns is economically as well as statistically signiﬁcant.
2 Excess Returns on Federal Funds Futures
Since Krueger and Kuttner (1996), Rudebusch (1998), and Brunner (2000), it has become
increasingly popular to measure near-term monetary policy expectations using federal
funds futures rates. Federal funds futures contracts have traded on the Chicago Board
of Trade exchange since October 1988 and settle based on the average federal funds rate
that prevails over a given calendar month.2 Let f
(n)
t denote the federal funds futures
contract rate for month t+n as quoted at the end of month t. We will refer to n =1as
the one-month-ahead futures contract, n =2as the two-month-ahead contract, and so
on. Let rt+n denote the ex post realized value of the federal funds rate for month t + n,
calculated as the average of the daily federal funds rates in month t+n for comparability
to the federal funds futures contracts.
The buyer of a fed funds futures contract locks in the contracted rate f
(n)
t for the
contract month t + n on a $5 million deposit. The contracts are cash-settled a few days
after expiration (with expiration occurring at the end of the contract month). At that
time, the buyer receives $5 million times the diﬀerence between f
(n)
t and the realized funds
rate rt+n converted to a monthly rate.3 As is standard for many futures contracts, there is
no up-front cost to either party of entering into the contract; both parties simply commit
to the contract rate and each posts a relatively small amount of securities as margin
collateral. Note that there is essentially no “alternative use of funds” or “opportunity
2The average federal funds rate is calculated as the simple mean of the daily averages published by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the federal funds rate on a non-business day is deﬁned to
be the rate that prevailed on the preceding business day.
3This means that fn
t − rt+n gets multiplied by (number of days in month/360), since the quoting
convention in the spot fed funds and fed funds futures markets use a 360-day year. See the CBOT web
site for additional details.
3cost” for the collateral, since margin requirements are typically posted with interest-
bearing U.S. Treasury securities.
We can therefore deﬁne the ex post realized excess return to the buyer of the futures
contract as
rx
(n)
t+n = f
(n)
t − rt+n. (1)
Since we will consider futures contracts with maturities n ranging from 1 to 6 months,
the excess returns in (1) will correspond to diﬀe r e n th o l d i n gp e r i o d sf o rd i ﬀerent values of
n. To make excess returns on these diﬀerent contracts directly comparable, we annualize
the returns by multiplying them by 12/n. Also, we measure returns in basis points. These
conventions will apply throughout the paper.
2.1 Average Excess Returns
To check whether the average excess returns are zero, we run the regression
rx
(n)
t+n = α
(n) + ε
(n)
t+n (2)
for diﬀerent contract horizons n.
Table 1 presents results from regression (1) for the forecast horizons n =1 ,...,6
m o n t h so v e rt h ee n t i r es a m p l ep e r i o df o rw h i c hw eh a v ef e d e r a lf u n d sf u t u r e sd a t a :
October 1988 through December 2003. This period will be the baseline for all of our
regressions below. We run the regression at monthly frequency, sampling the futures data
o nt h el a s td a yo fe a c hm o n t ht. We compute standard errors using the heteroskedasticity-
and autocorrelation-consistent procedure described in Hodrick (1992). Speciﬁcally, we
use standard errors (1A) from Hodrick (1992), which generalizes the Hansen-Hodrick
(1988) procedure to heteroskedastic disturbances.
Table 1. Average Excess Returns
n 123456
α(n) 41.2 44.6 49.9 57.5 66.3 73.4
t-stat 3 . 73 . 53 . 23 . 13 . 12 . 9
NOTE: The sample is 1988:10-2003:12. The observations are from the last day
of each month. The regression equation is (2).α (n) is measured in basis points.
“t-stat” represents the t-statistic based on Hodrick 1A standard errors.
According to the expectations hypothesis, expected excess returns on fed funds futures
should be zero. Table 1 shows, however, that excess returns on fed funds futures are on
average positive and signiﬁcant. As noted above, to make average excess returns on
diﬀerent contracts comparable, we have annualized them. For example, buying the fed
fund futures contract today and holding it until it matures 6 months from now generates
4an excess return of 73.4 basis points on average per year.4 The average excess returns in
Table 1 increase with the maturity of the futures contract and range between 41 and 73
basis points per year. The averages for the post-1994 period are just a bit lower at 32.4,
35.9, 38.9, 44.7, 51.1, and 58.3 basis points per year.
2.2 Excess Returns over the Business Cycle
Previous work using federal funds futures has generally stopped at this point, and pro-
ceeded under the assumption that expected excess returns on federal funds futures are
constant. However, in studies of long- and short-term Treasury markets, it has been
well-documented (Fama and Bliss 1987, Cochrane and Piazzesi 2003) that excess returns
on Treasury securities are predictable. In particular, expected excess returns on Trea-
suries are related to the business cycle: they are high in economic recessions and low in
expansions.
Figure 1 graphs the realized excess return rx
(4)
t+4 on the 4-month-ahead federal funds
futures contract from October 1988 through December 2003. Certainly, the time-variation
in these realized excess returns has been large, ranging from −4 6 2t o4 7 4b p . ( T h e s e
values are again annualized). The graph also suggests that there have been several periods
during which fed funds futures have generated particularly large excess returns. These
periods are periods during which the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates. These were
the years 1991 & 1992, early in 1995, fall of 1998 and the years 2001 & 2002. Two of these
periods 1991/2 and 2001/2, coincided with the only two recessions in our sample, when
the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates. The other two periods were not recessions,
but also periods with slower economic growth.
As a ﬁrst step to understanding the predictability of excess returns of fed fund futures,
we therefore regress their excess returns on a constant and a recession dummy Dt:
rx
(n)
t+n = β
(n)
0 + β
(n)
1 Dt + ε
(n)
t+n (3)
Figure 1 shows the ﬁtted values from this regression (as a step function) together with
the realized excess returns. Table 2 shows that the recession dummy is signiﬁcant for
all contracts with maturity longer than just 1 month. The estimated coeﬃcient on the
recession dummy suggests that excess returns are roughly 3 times higher in recessions
compared to what they are on average during other periods.
4This is not a percentage excess return, because the cost of purchasing the contract is zero, as
discussed previously. In other words, the unannualized excess return on the six-month-ahead contract
is, on average, $5 million times .367% times (number of days in contract month/360). The annualized
excess return is just double this amount (multiplying by 12/6).
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Figure 1: Annualized excess returns on the federal funds futures contract 4 months ahead.
The step function represents the ﬁtted values from a regression of rx
(4)
t+4 on a constant
and a recession dummy.
Table 2. Excess returns and Recessions
n 1 23456
const. 34.1 32.1 35.4 41.3 49.1 60.8
t-stat 3.8 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7
Dummy 71.9 125.7 144.6 161.3 167.5 157.2
t-stat 1.0 2.1 4.3 12.3 10.0 5.5
R2 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.13
NOTE: The regression equation is (3),w h e r eDt is a recession dummy. Excess
returns are annualized and measured in basis points.
Of course, recession dummies are only rough indicators of economic growth and,
moreover, are not useful as predictive variables. The reason is that recessions are not
known in real time, since the NBER’s business cycle dating committee declares recession
peaks and troughs as long as 2 years after they have actually occurred. In other words,
recession dummies do not represent information that investors can condition on when
deciding about their portfolios. Figure 1 suggests, however, that any business cycle
6indicator may be a good candidate for forecasting excess returns. In what follows, we
consider several business cycle indicators, including employment, Treasury yield spreads
and the corporate bond spread.
2.3 Employment
To see which variables forecast excess returns on fed funds futures, we run the predictive
regression
rx
(n)
t+n = β
(n)
0 + β
(n)
1 Xt + ε
(n)
t+n, (4)
where Xt is a vector of variables known to ﬁnancial markets in month t. Since GDP data
are only available at a quarterly frequency, it does not provide a very useful variable for
forecasting monthly excess returns. We therefore turn to a closely related measure of real
activity: employment. More precisely, we use monthly observations on the growth rate
in nonfarm payroll numbers from last year to this year.
Table 3 reports the forecasting results based on employment growth. The regression
also includes the futures rate itself on the right-hand side. The results show that em-
ployment growth is a signiﬁcant forecasting variable for contracts of any maturity. As we
would expect from our results using the recession dummy, expected excess returns and
employment growth are inversely related. The estimated slope coeﬃcients in Table 3 in-
crease with maturity and are between −0.13 and −0.62. Employment growth is measured
in basis points, which means that a 100 basis point drop in employment growth increases
expected excess returns by about 13 to 62 basis points. Over our sample, the mean and
standard deviation of employment growth were 141 and 144 basis points, which means
that a one-standard deviation shock to employment makes us expect around 90 basis
points more in excess returns on the 6-month futures contract. The futures rate f
(n)
t is
signiﬁcant for contracts with maturities of 3 months and higher.
Table 3. Excess Returns and Employment
n 123456
const. 16.6 22.9 19.5 14.8 2.9 −17.1
t-stat 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.1 −0.5
f
(n)
t 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.37
t-stat 1.1 1.5 2.1 3.2 4.5 5.7
NFP −0.13 −0.28 −0.39 −0.48 −0.56 −0.62
t-stat −1.2 −2.5 −3.5 −5.1 −8.0 −10.8
R2 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.38
NOTE: The regression equation is (4),w h e r eXt contains f
(n)
t and nonfarm
payroll employment (NFP) growth from t − 12 to t. The data on nonfarm
payroll numbers is from the Federal Reserve Economic Database in Saint
Louis. Excess returns and NFP growth are annualized and measured in basis
points.
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Figure 2: Annualized excess returns on the federal funds futures contract 4 months ahead.
The gray (green in color) function represents the ﬁtted values from a regression of rx
(4)
t+4
on a constant, employment growth and f
(4)
t itself.
The R2 in Table 3 suggest that we capture up to 38% of the variation in future excess
returns with employment growth and the futures rate. This result is remarkable, since
these R2 are comparable in size to those in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2003) who study
excess returns on Treasuries over much longer holding periods. To be more precise, we
study holding periods for fed funds futures that match their maturities, which range
from as short as 1 month up to 6 months, while Cochrane and Piazzesi (2003) study
annual holding periods for Treasuries. (We may be confusing the reader by annualizing
the excess returns of holding fed funds futures until they mature, which occurs in a few
months. This normalization just involves multiplying excess returns with 12×n. This
multiplication does not aﬀect the t-statistics or R2 in our regressions).
Figure 2 shows that employment is not only doing well in the two recessions. Indeed,
employment also forecasts high returns in 1995 and shows little up-wiggles in 1998.
Employment also does a good job at capturing periods with low returns, such as 1994
and 1999.
Nonfarm payroll numbers are released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the ﬁrst
Friday of each month. In other words, January payroll numbers are only released on the
8ﬁrst Friday of February. To perform the regressions in Table 3 in real time, however, we
need to know the January payroll number at the end of January, since we are forecasting
returns from buying fed funds futures at the end of January and holding them until
expiration. To see whether the regression would give very diﬀerent results, we also
forecast excess returns from January to expiration using employment numbers only up
through December. The results (not reported) are virtually identical. The relevant R2
are 2, 7, 15, 21, 30 and 37%. The point estimates and t-statistics are almost identical to
those in Table 3.
A na d d i t i o n a lr e a l - t i m ed a t ai s s u ei st h a tw eh a v eu s e dt h eﬁnal vintage of nonfarm
payroll employment data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database.
In actuality, however, the nonfarm payrolls numbers are revised twice after their initial
release and undergo an annual benchmark revision every June, so the ﬁnal vintage num-
bers are not available for forecasting in real time. Ignoring this issue may thus bias our
results somewhat in favor of predictability. This error should be small though, given
that we are using 12-month (rather than 1-month) changes in employment and that our
results are robust to lagging employment an entire month, which conﬁrms that the pre-
dictability of excess returns is exploiting the low-frequency movements in payroll growth
from Figure 2, rather than month-to-month variation. In addition, we demonstrate next
that we are able to generate very much the same pattern of predictability (albeit with
slightly lower R2)u s i n gﬁnancial market variables such as yield spreads and corporate
risk spreads, which are data that were clearly available to market participants in real
time.
2.4 Yield Spreads and Corporate Spreads
In studies of long- and short-term Treasury markets, it has been well-documented (Fama
and Bliss 1987, Cochrane and Piazzesi 2003) that expected excess returns on Treasury
securities can be forecasted with the Treasury yield curve. For example, Cochrane and Pi-
azzesi show that a simple tent-shaped function of 1 through 5-year forward rates explains
excess returns on holding long Treasuries securities for 1 year with an R2 of 35—40%. Of
course, these ﬁndings are related to the fact that yields have been used as business cycle
indicators. For example, the Stock and Watson (1989) leading index is mainly based on
term spreads. A natural question is therefore whether yields also forecast excess returns
on fed funds futures.
Table 4 reports results from predictions based on a set of yield spreads. We select
four diﬀerent term spreads based on diﬀerences of the 6 month T-bill rate and the 1, 2, 5,
and 10 year zero-coupon Treasury yields.5 A sc a nb es e e ni nT a b l e4 ,t h e r ei ss i g n i ﬁcant
evidence that excess returns on federal funds futures contracts have been signiﬁcantly
predictable with yield spreads for contracts with 3 months to maturity or more: R2 values
range from 8—21% for the longer horizon contracts and some t-statistics are well above
5We also considered other Treasury bills, but none of them entered signiﬁcantly. Moreover, we
included the own fed funds futures rate f
(n)
t as another regressor, but it was not signiﬁcant.
92. Although generally not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level for shorter horizons, we
consistently estimate the same pattern of coeﬃcients for the shorter-horizon contracts
as for the longer-horizon contracts, with the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients increasing
monotonically with the horizon of the contract n (except for the n =1loadings on the
2-1 and 10-5 year spreads).
Table 4. Excess Returns and Treasury Spreads
n const. 1 -1 / 2y r 2-1y r 5 - 2y r 1 0 - 5y r R2
1 56.4 0.37 −1.21 1.46 −1.32 0.01
(2.0) (0.3) (−1.1) (1.7) (−1.7)
2 62.6 −0.27 −0.96 1.50 −1.29 0.02
(2.2) (−0.2) (−0.7) (1.6) (−1.7)
3 79.5 −0.67 −1.29 2.27 −2.00 0.04
(2.5) (−0.5) (−1.2) (−2.0) (−4.5)
4 98.7 −0.79 −1.80 3.19 −2.87 0.08
(2.6) (−0.7) (−1.6) (3.3) (−3.6)
5 131.2 −1.43 −1.90 4.03 −3.90 0.14
(2.8) (−1.2) (−1.2) (2.6) (−3.1)
6 164.9 −2.32 −1.51 4.26 −4.43 0.21
(3.4) (−1.8) (−1.0) (3.2) (−4.0)
NOTE: The regression equation is (3),w h e r eXt consists of yield spreads
on zero-coupon Treasuries (measured in basis points). The maturities of the
Treasuries are 1-1/2 year, 2-1 year, 5-2 year and 10-2 year. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. The Treasury yield data are from the Federal Reserve
Board.
Figure 3 plots realized excess returns on the four-month-ahead fed funds futures
contract together with the ﬁtted values from Table 4 (where realized returnsa r es h i f t e d
up by 500 bp to more clearly present both in the same graph). The yield spreads seem to
be most successful at capturing the rise in excess returns in 2001 and the runups in 1990
through 1992, suggesting that the estimated linear combination of yields may indeed
capture the relationship between excess returns and the business cycle.
We also investigate whether another leading indicator of the business cycle, the BBB-
Treasury risk spread on 10-year corporate bonds, can also help to predict excess returns
on fed funds futures. Results are reported in Table 5, and corroborate the hypothesis
that measures of business cycle risk in general may be useful predictors of excess returns
in the fed funds futures market. The estimated coeﬃcients on the corporate bond spread
in these regressions are signiﬁcant for federal funds futures contracts at all maturities,
with R2 of 11—16% for the longer-horizon contracts. The ﬁtted values from this regression
for the four-month-ahead contract are also plotted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: The top line are annualized excess returns rx
(4)
t+4 on the 4-month ahead futures
contract (shifted up by 500 bp), the middle line are ﬁtted values from the regression on
Treasury yield spreads (Table 4) and the bottom line are ﬁtted values from the regression
on the corporate bond spread (Table 5, shifted down by 500 bp).
T a b l e5 .E x c e s sR e t u r n sa n dC o r p o r a t eB o n dS p r e a d s
n 1234 5 6
const. −28.0 −56.5 −79.2 −94.2 −115.6 −128.7
t-stat −0.6 −1.2 −1.6 −1.7 −1.9 −1.9
f
(n)
t 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.17
t-stat 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.2
BBB 0.29 0.48 0.59 0.65 0.72 0.76
t-stat 1.52 .22 .52 .52 .72 .4
R2 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.16
NOTE: The regression equation is (3),w h e r eXt consists of the own futures
contract rate f
(n)
t and the BBB-Treasury corporate bond spread. The note
to Table 1 applies. Data on BBB corporate bond yields with 10 years to
maturity are from Merrill Lynch; data on 10-year Treasury par yields (the
comparable Treasury yield) are from the Federal Reserve Board.
11To sum up, we ﬁnd substantial evidence for time variation in expected excess returns
on fed funds futures. Surprisingly, the strongest evidence comes from conditioning on
employment growth–a macroeconomic variable–instead of lagged ﬁnancial data. How-
ever, our sample is short, just 15 years, and we therefore do have to treat this result with
the appropriate caution.
2.5 One-Month Holding Period Returns
Our sample period only spans 15 years, which results in as few as 30 independent windows
for our longest-horizon (6-month-ahead) fed funds futures contracts. A way to reduce
this problem and check on the robustness of our results is to consider the excess returns
an investor would realize from holding an n-month-ahead federal funds futures contract
for just one month–by purchasing the contract and then selling it back as an (n − 1)-
month-ahead contract in one month’s time–rather than holding the contract all the
way through to maturity. By considering one-month holding period returns on fed funds
futures, we reduce potential problems of serial correlation and sample size for the longer-
horizon contracts, and give ourselves 180 completely independent windows of data for all
contracts.
We thus consider regressions of the form:
f
(n)
t − f
(n−1)
t+1 = β
(n)
0 + β
(n)
1 Xt + ε
(n)
t+1 (5)
where f
(n)
t denotes the n-month-ahead contract rate on the last day of month t, f
(n−1)
t+1
denotes the (n − 1)-month-ahead contract rate on the last day of month t +1 ,a n d
the diﬀerence between these two rates is the ex post realized one-month holding period
return on the n-month-ahead contract.6 Using speciﬁcation (5), the residuals are serially
uncorrelated under the null hypothesis of no predictability of excess returns, because all
variables in equation (5) are in ﬁnancial markets’ information set by the end of month
t +1 .
Tables 6 presents the results of our previous analyses applied to this alternative speciﬁ-
cation, where the regressors are the own contract rate and employment growth. Although
the R2 values are uniformly lower, as is to be expected from quasi-ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the
left-hand side variable, our previous results are robust to this alternative speciﬁcation.
6The investor’s realized monetary return on this transaction is $5 million times the diﬀerence in rates
f
(n)
t − f
(n−1)
t+1 times (number of days in contract month/360). Since these contracts are “marked to
market” essentially every day, the investor realizes the full monetary return to this transaction in month
t +1 ; in particular, the investor does not need to wait until the contracts mature at the end of month
t + n to realize the return. As before, the opportunity cost of engaging in this transaction is negligible,
so the realized return is also the realized excess return.
12Table 6. One-Month Excess Returns and Employment
n 23456
const. 29.8 26.8 39.7 40.7 −19.5
t-stat 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 −0.2
f
(n)
t 0.16 0.24 0.29 0.33 0.59
t-stat 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.6 2.2
Nonfarm −0.43 −0.63 −0.76 −0.83 −1.03
t-stat −3.2 −3.8 −4.2 −4.2 −4.1
R2 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.14
NOTE: The regression equation is (5),w h e r eXt contains f
(n)
t and nonfarm
payroll employment growth from t − 12 to t. One-month excess returns are
annualized by multiplying them with 12 and measured in basis points.
2.6 Eurodollar Futures
We also check whether our predictability results hold for eurodollar futures. Some ad-
vantages of considering eurodollar futures in addition to federal funds futures are that
eurodollar futures contracts are more liquid (they are currently the most actively traded
futures contracts in the world), eurodollar futures are available over a slightly longer
sample period (our data begin in March 1985), and eurodollar futures have maturities
that extend out to several years, providing an intermediate horizon between fed funds
futures and longer-dated Treasury securities.
Eurodollar futures have traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange since 1981 and
settle based on the spot three-month LIBOR eurodollar time deposit rate prevailing on
the date of expiration.7 In contrast to federal funds futures, eurodollar futures have
maturities that are denominated in quarters rather than months, so we let ef
(n)
t denote
the eurodollar futures contract rate in quarter t for a contract expiring at the end of
quarter t + n. The corresponding realized rate ert+n i st h es p o tt h r e e - m o n t he u r o d o l l a r
rate that prevails on the day of expiration of the futures contract ef
(n)
t . The ex post excess
return realized from holding the n-quarter-ahead contract to maturity is ef
(n)
t − ert+n,
and the ex post realized excess return to holding the n-quarter-ahead contract for one
quarter is ef
(n)
t − ef
(n−1)
t+1 . Regression equations for analyzing these excess returns are
otherwise identical to equation (3) for federal funds futures.
Table 7 presents the results of our previous analyses applied to eurodollar futures
7The spot three-month London Interbank Oﬀered Rate for three-month time deposits of U.S. dollars
in London is collected and published daily by the British Bankers’ Association. The spot eurodollar
market is a very active one, thus these rates match three-month time deposit rates in the U.S. very
closely. The March, June, September, and December eurodollar futures contracts are by far the most
actively traded, with expiration on these contracts near the middle of those months. Contracts are
cash-settled a few days after expiration with the purchaser receiving $1 million times the diﬀerence
efn
t − ert+n times (91/360). See the CME web site for additional details.
13contracts with maturities of n =1 ,...,8 quarters ahead. Panel A shows that average
excess returns on eurodollar futures are between 60 and 105 basis points per year. Excess
returns also exhibits the same type of predictability pattern as fed funds futures. Panel B
shows that nonfarm payroll employment growth is statistically signiﬁcant at all horizons,
with R2 values ranging from 21 to over 43%. The results for Treasury yield spreads and
corporate bond spreads are also signiﬁcant and similar to those for fed funds futures (not
reported). These results show that if anything, risk premia are even more important for
eurodollar futures than what we have estimated for federal funds futures.
Table 7. Results for Eurodollar Futures
Panel A: Average excess returns (annualized)
n 1234567 8
const. 59.98 1 .17 0 .7 102.5 104.4 102.8 99.1 105.8
t-stat 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0
Panel B: Predictive regressions using employment growth and futures rate
const. 13.36 −8.9 −14.0 −22.5 −29.1 −26.4 −29.6 −52.4
t-stat 0.2 −0.2 −0.4 −0.6 −0.6 −0.5 −0.6 −1.0
ef
(n)
t 0.32 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.34
t-stat 2 . 54 . 76 . 46 . 35 . 55 . 05.25 .1
NFP −0.84 −0.90 −0.87 −81.8 −0.73 −0.65 −0.55 −0.44
t-stat 5.3 −8.3 −11.2 −11.2 −11.6 −10.9 −10.2 −7.6
R2 0.21 0.31 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.43
3 Predictability of Excess Returns in Real Time
We have documented that excess returns on federal funds futures were predictable by
business-cycle indicators such as employment growth, Treasury yield spreads or the cor-
porate bond spread. To what extent could an investor have predicted these returns in
real time? To answer this question, we ﬁrst perform a set of rolling “out-of-sample” re-
gressions. To see whether market participants may have based their investment strategies
on similar forecasts, we provide some intriguing historical evidence on actual trades in
the fed funds and eurodollar futures market.
3.1 Rolling Regressions
Figure 4 shows real-time forecasts together with full-sample forecasts from Table 2 based
on employment growth and the own futures rate. The real-time forecasts for month t+1
are constructed by estimating the slope coeﬃcients with data up to the current month t.
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Figure 4: The top panel shows real-time and full-sample forecasts of rx
(4)
t+4.T h em i d d l e
panel shows the rolling estimates of the coeﬃcient on the own futures rate f
(4)
t . The
ﬂat line is the full-sample coeﬃcient from Table 2. The lower panel shows the rolling
estimates of the coeﬃcient on employment growth. Again, the ﬂat line is the full-sample
coeﬃcient from Table 2.
These forecasts are performed starting in January 1990, when we only have 12 months
of data to estimate three parameters. The graph suggests that the real-time ﬁtted values
are quite close to the full-sample ﬁtted values over most of the sample - indeed, the two
series are essentially identical from the beginning of 1994 onward. The middle and lower
panels in Figure 4 show the rolling estimates of the slope coeﬃcients together with their
full sample counterparts. The graphs suggest that the rolling point estimates settle down
after 1994.
3.2 Data on Market Participants’ Long and Short Positions
The previous section shows that excess returns on fed funds and eurodollar futures were
potentially predictable to investors in real time using rolling regressions. In this section,
w ep r e s e n ts o m ee v i d e n c ei n d i c a t i n gt h a ti n f o r m e di n v e s t o r sa tt h et i m ea c t u a l l ydid
correctly forecast the excess returns that were subsequently realized.
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Figure 5: The upper panel shows net positions in eurodollar futures. The lower panel
shows long and short positions separately.
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) requires all individuals
or institutions holding 10,000 futures contracts or more in a given commodity to report
their positions to the CFTC, and the extent to which these positions are hedged.8 In
the eurodollar (fed funds) futures markets, about 90% (95%) of open interest is held by
individuals or institutions that must report to the CFTC as a result of this requirement.
The CFTC reports the aggregates of these data with a three-day lag, broken down into
hedging and non-hedging categories and into short and long positions, in the weekly
Commitments of Traders report, available on the CFTC’s web site.
The lower panel in Figure 5 plots the percentage of long and short open interest
in eurodollar futures held by noncommercial market participants–those market partici-
pants that are classiﬁed by the CFTC as not hedging oﬀsetting positions that arise out
of their normal (non-futures related) business operations.9 The number of all open long
positions in these contracts held by noncommercial market participants, expressed as a
8The exact reporting threshold varies by commodity. The 10,000 number applies to eurodollar futures,
as reported on the CME’s web site.
9The primary example of a commercial participant in the eurodollar futures market would be a
ﬁnancial institution engaged in lending to commercial and industrial enterprises for periods of 1 to 5
years.
16percentage of total reportable open interest, is plotted in blue, and the number of all
open short positions (as a percentage of reportable open interest) held by these partici-
pants is plotted in red. Analogous data are available for fed funds futures, but we focus
o ne u r o d o l l a rf u t u r e sp o s i t i o n sh e r ea st h i sm a r k e ti st h i c k e r ,d a t aa r ea v a i l a b l eb a c k
to 1986, and contracts run oﬀ less frequently (only once per quarter rather than every
month), which reduces some high-frequency variation in the percentage long and short
series.10 The patterns in federal funds futures noncommercial holdings look very similar,
albeit noisier for the reasons cited above.
T h ep a t t e r n st h a te m e r g ei nF i g u r e5a r es t r i k i n gw h e nc o m p a r e dt ot h er e a l i z e d
excess return series plotted earlier. Noncommercial market participants began taking
on a huge net long position in late 2000, only a few months before excess returns in
these contracts (both eurodollars and fed funds futures) began to soar. Noncommercial
market participants also took on substantial net long positions from mid-1990 through
mid-1991 and in late 1995, again correctly forecasting excess returns over these periods,
and noncommercial participants took on a very substantial net short position in late 1993
through mid-1994, correctly anticipating the strongly negative excess returns that were
realized when the Fed began tightening in 1994.
The upper panel of Figure 5 plots the diﬀerence between the noncommercial percent-
age long and short series as the “net long position” of noncommercial market participants.
Just from eyeballing the ﬁgure, we can see that net positions forecast subsequent excess
returns in both the fed funds futures and eurodollar futures markets. Regression analysis
conﬁr m st h a tt h i sv a r i a b l ei sh i g h l ys i g n i ﬁcant as a predictor of excess returns in the fed
funds futures market at horizons of 3 month or more (and eurodollar futures markets at
horizons of 1 quarter or more), with R2 values ranging from 7—19%.
The obvious interpretation of this result is that noncommercial market participants
at the time were well aware of the upcoming excess returns on these contracts and
positioned themselves accordingly, at the expense of those engaged in hedging other
ﬁnancial activities. The hedgers — commercial ﬁrms — essentially paid an insurance
premium to noncommercial market participants for providing hedging services. These
rents are not “competed away” by other noncommercial market participants. There
are several possible answers to this question. The futures market may not be perfectly
competitive, with barriers to entry and noncommercial market participants facing limits
o nt h es i z eo ft h ep o s i t i o n st h a tt h e ym a yt a k e ;c o m m e r c i a lp a r t i c i p a n t sw i t hh e d g i n g
demand thus do not face a perfectly elastic supply curve for either the long or short side of
these futures contracts. Moreover, noncommercial market participants may themselves
be risk averse. For example, futures traders in these markets may be most averse to
taking on risky positions precisely when their own jobs are in jeopardy, around the times
of depressed aggregate economic activity. The hypothesis that excess returns in these
markets would be competed away requires both an assumption of perfectly competitive
futures markets and of risk-neutral market participants — both of these assumptions may
not apply.
10Open interest is almost always highest in the front-month or front-quarter contract, so the running
oﬀ of these contracts can create jumps.
174 Risk-Adjusted Monetary Policy Expectations
How misleading would it be to ignore risk premia on fed funds and eurodollar futures–or
to allow for constant risk premia but to ignore the time-variation in these premia–and
treat the unadjusted (or constant risk-adjusted) prices of these securities as measures of
monetary policy expectations? For fed funds futures, these forecast errors are just the
excess returns on the fed funds futures contract. For example, the excess return on the
4-month ahead contract rx
(4)
t+4 = f
(4)
t −rt+4 is simply minus the error in forecasting rt+4.
Therefore, we can therefore use our previous results to adjust these forecasts for risk
premia.
Table 8 reports summary statistics on forecasting errors made by forecasting the funds
rate with the appropriate future rate over diﬀerent horizons. Panel A shows that average
forecast errors are negative, which suggests that futures rates tend to underestimate
t h ea c t u a lf u n d sr a t eb y3t o3 7b a s i sp o i n t so na v e r a g e . H o w e v e r ,e r r o r si nd i ﬀerent
directions cancel each other, when we take the average. We therefore also compute the
absolute value of these errors. Their mean absolute values range from 8 to 51 basis points.
The autocorrelation of these errors is substantial, especially for longer horizon forecasts.
The autocorrelation coeﬃcient of these errors is 0.84 for 6-month ahead forecasts. These
coeﬃcients suggest that using fed fund futures as unadjusted forecasts leads to systematic
errors.
Table 8. Forecast Errors using Fed Funds Futures
Panel A: Expectations Hypothesis
n 1 2 3456
avg. error −3.4 −7.4 −12.5 −19.2 −27.6 −36.7
MAE 7.9 14.6 22.6 32.4 42.8 51.3
autocorr. 0.06 0.47 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.84
Panel B: Risk-adjusted Forecasts
MAE 8.1 13.8 20.6 28.1 33.7 36.1
auto 0.05 0.44 0.66 0.71 0.75 0.79
NOTE: “n” is the forecasting horizon, “avg. error” is the average forecast
error, “MAE” is the mean absolute error, “autocorr.” is the ﬁrst-order auto-
correlation coeﬃcient.
To visualize the situations in which these errors are made, Figure 6 plots the realized
funds rate rt+4 in the upper panel and forecast errors rt+4 − f
(4)
t for that realization in
the lower panel. In other words, these forecasts are based on information available 4
18months ago. The forecast errors are already demeaned. Interestingly, Figure 6 suggests
that forecasts based on the expectations hypothesis tend to adjust to slowly to changes
in direction. For example, forecast errors tend to be negative in periods when the funds
rate falls. They tend to be positive in periods when the funds rate goes up. In other
words, futures rates are useful as an indication of where the funds rate will be in the
future. However, the indication provided by unadjusted futures rates “lags behind:” long
after the Fed has started easing, the futures rate still forecasts high future funds rates.
We can now use our results from Table 3 to adjust futures-based forecasts for risk
premia. Panel B in Table 8 reports the summary statistics of these forecasts. Since the
forecasts are mean zero by construction, we do not report the corresponding rows. For
short horizons, the absolute errors are comparable to those under the expectations hy-
pothesis. For long-horizon forecasts, however, risk-adjusted forecasts are more successful
than unadjusted forecasts. The diﬀerence between the two types of forecasts is 15 ba-
sis points. Also, while risk-adjusted forecasts still produce autocorrelated mistakes, the
autocorrelation coeﬃcients tend to be smaller than for unadjusted forecasts.
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Figure 6: The upper panel shows the actual funds rate. The lower panel shows forecast
errors with unadjusted (red) and adjusted forecasts (blue).
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